When We Can’t Wait on Truth:  The Nature of Rhetoric in The Rhetoric of Science by Crick, Nathan
Poroi 
An Interdisciplinary Journal of Rhetorical Analysis 
and Invention 
ISSN 2151-2957 
Volume 10 Issue 2 DOI: 10.13008/2151-2957.1174 
Article 8 
12-30-2014 
When We Can’t Wait on Truth: The Nature of Rhetoric in The 
Rhetoric of Science 
Nathan Crick 
Texas A&M, crick@tamu.edu 
Copyright © 2014 Nathan Crick 
Recommended Citation 
Crick, Nathan. "When We Can’t Wait on Truth: The Nature of Rhetoric in The Rhetoric of Science." Poroi 10, 
Iss. 2 (2014): Article 8. https://doi.org/10.13008/2151-2957.1174 
Hosted by Iowa Research Online 
This The Rhetoric of Science and Its Epistemology is brought to you for free and open access by Iowa Research 
Online. It has been accepted for inclusion in Poroi by an authorized administrator of Iowa Research Online. For 
more information, please contact lib-ir@uiowa.edu. 
When We Can’t Wait On Truth
The Nature of Rhetoric in 
of Science 
Nathan Crick 
Texas A&M University
College Station, TX
Poroi 10, 2 (December 2014)
Keywords: scientific controversy, sophist, epistemology, 
pragmatism, rhetoric of science, logic 
We readily concede that the law courts and the political forum 
are special cases of our everyday world, a world in which social 
reality is uncontroversially 
us can also entertain the possibility Aristotle could never 
countenance: the possibility that the claims of science are solely 
the products of persuasion  
(Gross, 
As you phrase it, oratory is the craft that exe
through speech. Somebody might take you up, if he wanted to 
make a fuss in argument, and say, ‘So you’re saying that 
arithmetic is oratory, are you Gorgias?’ I am sure, however, that 
you are not saying that either arithmetic or geometr
 (Plato, 
None of this suggests that science is 
person could reach so bizarre a conclusion 
(Gross, 2006, 78).
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subordinates to itself just about everything that can be 
accomplished” (Plato, Gorgias, 456b). In short, Gorgias begins the 
dialogue by setting out the proposition that truth is a product of 
persuasion without remainder. Socrates, however, will have none of 
this, and soon forces Gorgias into retreat. First, Gorgias admits that 
there are two types of persuasion, “one providing conviction 
without knowledge, the other providing knowledge” (Plato, 
Gorgias, 454d). Second, he reduces the scope of rhetoric to 
decisions which take place “in law courts and in those other large 
gatherings” in which members of the public deliberate about 
“matters that are just and unjust” (Plato, Gorgias, 454b). Although 
it will soon become apparent that rhetoric, according to Socrates, 
does not even have authority there (Plato, Gorgias, 502e), the 
opening dialectic clearly sets out the terms of the debate, with one 
side granting rhetoric a significant, constitutive role in production 
of knowledge and the other side considering it a form of flattery 
capable only of persuading the masses concerning subjects they 
know nothing about. 
Reminiscent of Plato’s dialogue, Gross frames his book from the 
opening page as a revival and defense of the sophistical position 
associated with Gorgias. There, Gross introduces the guiding 
principle of the text, that “rhetorically, the creation of knowledge is 
a task beginning with self-persuasion and ending with the 
persuasion of others” (Gross, 1996, 3). He goes on to make explicit 
his debt to the sophistical tradition, writing that “this attitude 
toward knowledge stems from the first Sophistic, an early 
philosophical relativism made notorious by Socrates” (Gross, 1996, 
3). Aristotle had tried to restrict the scope of rhetoric to judicial and 
political forums, but Gross feels this compromise to be 
unwarranted: “If scientific texts are to be analyzed rhetorically, this 
Aristotelian limitation must be removed; the spirit of the first 
Sophistic must roam free” (Gross, 1996, 3). This removal of the 
Aristotelian limitation allows him to use Aristotle’s Rhetoric, rather 
than any sophistical tract, as the “master guide to the exegesis of 
scientific texts” (Gross, 1996, 18). For instance, Gross uses the 
Rhetoric to explore the function of style, analogy, arrangement in 
scientific argument, to demonstrate that “ethos, pathos, and logos, 
are naturally present in scientific texts,” and to show that “as a fully 
human enterprise, science can constrain, but hardly eliminate, the 
full range of persuasive choices on the part of its participants” 
(Gross, 1996, 16). Here Gorgias is brought to life again to stimulate 
critical investigation into the relationship between rhetoric and 
truth. 
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Yet the productive controversy that the original publication of 
The Rhetoric of Science helped stimulate, and which Gross is 
rightly proud of provoking, also had the consequence of forcing him 
into partial retreat from the rhetorical tradition that he featured so 
strongly in the text. In the new 1996 preface to the original 1990 
text of the The Rhetoric of Science, Gross still holds to the 
fundamental position that “Rhetoric has a crucial epistemic role in 
science” and “that science is constituted through interactions that 
are essentially rhetorical” (Gross, 1996, x). However, at the same 
time he defends the place of rhetoric in science, he admits, on 
reflection, the “relative intellectual vacuity of classical rhetorical 
theory” (Gross, 1996, xix).  The resulting complete revision of the 
book in 2006, renamed Starring the Text: The Place of Rhetoric in 
Science Studies, significantly reduces the presence of classical 
rhetoric while at the same time tempering what he calls “radical 
epistemological inferences that were designed to provoke thought” 
(Gross, 2006, ix). In their places is a much stronger presence of the 
theories of language put forward by W.V.O. Quine, Donald 
Davidson, Nelson Goodman, and Hilary Putnam, that are used to 
give a “rhetorical account of truth” (Gross, 2006, 41). It is thus to 
the tradition of analytic philosophy, and not to classical rhetoric, 
that Gross looks for defense of a rhetoric of science when it needs 
defending. 
Yet this repositioning of rhetoric still leaves the Socratic 
question unanswered: what, exactly, is the nature of this art that is 
said to be “constitutive of scientific knowledge”? (Gross, 2006, 8). 
Gross mounts a strong case that “rhetoric is indeed epistemic in the 
deepest sense,” but often at the expense of explicit reference to that 
tradition (Gross, 2006, 13). But by leaving the classical vocabulary 
behind, Gross appears to leave himself without any clear definition 
of the nature of rhetoric itself. For instance, it is not exactly clear 
what Quine, Davidson, Goodman, or Putnam would make of having 
their theories of language and truth be described as “rhetorical.” 
What could this mean? Gross offers the following answer based on 
their insights: 
When scientific truth is a consensus concerning the 
coherence of a range of sentences, rather than the fit 
between the facts and reality, conceptual change need no 
longer be justified on the basis of its closer 
approximation to that reality. It is instead the natural 
result of the persuasive process that is science, a 
persistent effort to renew consensus, despite a constant 
influx of potentially disruptive sentences (Gross, 2006, 
44). 
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If we take this passage at its word, rhetoric represents the 
conscious effort to create, transform, and maintain consensus 
concerning a range of sentences by either producing or responding 
to other sentences that might disrupt that consensus. Yet since all 
language, under a coherence view of truth, is tasked with either 
disrupting or producing consensus, there is no such thing as a non-
rhetorical language. The only difference between scientific and 
political rhetoric, therefore, is in the subject matter of those 
sentences and the nature and scope of the audience charged with 
coming to consensus. The task of the rhetorician, from this 
perspective, thus changes from identifying and analyzing particular 
texts that are distinguished by their rhetorical character to 
disclosing the implicit rhetorical qualities that are inherent in even 
the most technical, scientific tract that are many steps removed 
from the law court or assembly. 
The enduring question that persists in the wake of The Rhetoric 
of Science, even after the passing of two decades, is what remains of 
rhetoric when it redescribes its aims and foundations through the 
discourse of analytical philosophy. I argue in this essay that the 
turn toward analytical philosophy, represented here chiefly in the 
work of Quine, offers a highly sophisticated holistic epistemology at 
the expense of stripping rhetoric of its character as a situated art 
whose aim is the constitution of judgment. What remains of 
rhetoric in this context is thus precisely what Gross later judged it 
to be—a relatively vacuous vocabulary for identifying tropes, 
figures, and enthymemes. However, this vacuity is not intrinsic to 
language of classical rhetoric, but is a result of reorienting rhetoric 
from problems of public judgment to questions of epistemological 
validity. In summary, by reading Gross’s work alongside that of 
Quine and the extant speeches of Gorgias, I suggest that analytic 
philosophy, while an important resource for our understanding of 
the nature of scientific theorizing, is an inadequate theoretical basis 
for the rhetoric of science, and that a “full” rhetoric of science must 
return to Gross’s original project of enlivening classical texts to 
produce new insights into contemporary problems.  
The Search for a “Full” Rhetorical of Science 
 
Why The Rhetoric of Science remains such a provocative text is 
precisely the boldness of its claim. Siding with the Platonic Gorgias, 
Gross sweeps away the constraint of realism in order to make way 
for what he calls a “fully rhetorical” account of science and of 
knowledge. With the false veneer of realism stripped away, rhetoric 
thus becomes synonymous with any and all conscious efforts, 
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whether in science or in public, to discursively invent, articulate, 
and argue for an account of things that we are supposed to take to 
be true. Realism, that is to say, prevents a fully rhetorical 
description of science whenever it posits that “after analysis, 
something unrhetorical remains, a hard ‘scientific’ core” of 
“untranslatable scientific meaning” (Gross, 1996, 33). Once this 
hard scientific core is revealed, through the work of Quine et al., to 
be just one more utterance within a man-made fabric of linguistic 
statements that impinges on experience only along the edges, the 
possibility opens up of the ability to reconstruct science 
“rhetorically, without remainder” (Gross, 1996,  33). Gross thus 
argues for a view of rhetoric that does not simply appear in certain 
scientific contexts or situations, but is ubiquitous in every claim put 
forward by a scientist. The task of the rhetoric of science is clear: to 
use classical rhetorical terminology, such as ethos, logos, pathos, 
style, analogy, and arrangement, to redescribe all those scientific 
activities previously given only a rational account based on the 
presuppositions of realism. This is an ambitious, interesting, and 
partially successful enterprise. It proposes that: “If a rhetorical 
reconstruction describes rhetorically every aspect that a rational 
reconstruction describes rationally, a complete rhetoric of science 
becomes possible” (Gross, 1996, 34).  
The revised book, Starring the Text: The Place of Rhetoric in 
Science Studies, exchanges this provocative tone for a more 
tempered position. As indicated by the title, Gross no longer wishes 
to make sweeping assertions, Gorgias-style, that all science is a 
product of persuasion and rhetoric without remainder. Instead, in a 
context in which the discipline of “science studies” have come into 
its own, he wishes to advocate that rhetoric has a unique 
perspective on science, is “one discipline among many joined in a 
common enterprise,” and has for its contribution the ability to 
“star” the “texts, tables, and visuals of science” in order to make 
“their hermeneutic unraveling central” (Gross, 2006, ix). Starring 
the Text thus advances a perspectival account of the rhetoric of 
science, suggesting that if we look at scientific texts rhetorically, we 
are able to gain new insights into them that would be left 
unrecognized when taken simply to be dispassionate 
representations of experience, reality, or other approaches in the 
meta-field project of science studies. Therefore, counter to the 
radical claims of his first book, he writes: 
None of this suggests that science is only rhetoric; no 
sane person could reach so bizarre a conclusion. These 
chapters can show no more than that, like sociology, 
history, and philosophy, rhetoric is a discipline; 
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moreover, its disciplinary status entitles us to speak of 
all the written and visual records of the sciences from a 
rhetorical perspective (Gross, 2006, 78).  
Classical terminology is still vital to this project, but understood as 
a way of looking at texts, not as a means to give a totalizing account 
of all of the complex practices of science that hitherto have lacked 
clear rhetorical counterparts. 
However, this retreat from the provocative sophistical nature of 
the first book—a quality that made the initial text such an effective 
vehicle to spark productive controversy—does little to alter its 
fundamental view of rhetoric itself. It remains what it was in the 
first text: a handbook of techniques that can be used to advocate for 
a position that lacks sufficient rational certainty or empirical 
verifiability to defend itself without those techniques. In effect, 
then, Gross actually accepts, in both books, the Platonic position 
that the difference between rhetoric and non-rhetoric is the 
difference between a discourse grounded in opinion (and therefore 
reliant on appeals to emotion, authority, and style to flatter the 
ignorant) and a discourse grounded in knowledge of the real (and 
therefore dependent only on appeals to reason to inform the wise). 
But Gross differs from Plato by accepting Quine’s position that 
there is no such thing as a discourse grounded in knowledge of the 
real. Therefore, although he acknowledges that science is not only 
rhetoric, this is simply meant to acknowledge that “texts depend 
heavily on a set of practices well outside the scope of rhetorical 
analysis” (Gross, 2006, 21). With respect to the texts of science, 
however, he still agrees with Gorgias, who in his Encomium of 
Helen suggested studying the “arguments of astronomers, who 
replace opinion with opinion: displacing one but implanting 
another, they make incredible, invisible matters apparent to the 
eyes of opinion” (Gorgias, DK11, trans. Gagarin and Woodruff, 
1995). Or, as Gross says of Newton, “To move from the early papers 
to the Opticks is not to move from one science to another but from 
one rhetoric to another” (Gross, 2006, 74). The task of the rhetoric 
of science, that is to say, remains to redescribe rhetorically 
everything in science that we thought was purely rational. In this 
light, the dominant method throughout both books remains the 
same: to show through case studies how what we commonly think 
of as a purely rational procedure by which scientists make 
inferences about reality is actually a rhetorical exercise to gain 
acceptance by an audience for the validity of an utterance by using 
the full resources of persuasion.  
Here are some examples. Regarding taxonomy: “Potential 
species are brought to life by giving them presence, by placing these 
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purposeful collections of living things at center stage in audience 
consciousness” (Gross, 2006, 57). Regarding Newton: “The 
rhetorical value of meticulous detail extends to measurement. 
Everywhere in Opticks, measurement, so important in the early 
papers, increases in importance; in seemingly every case, 
measurements previously made are remade” (Gross, 2006, 74). 
Regarding Copernicus: “I shall how in Narratio Prima, Rheticus 
justifies his choice of the Copernican over the Ptolemaic hypothesis. 
To do so, he goes beyond argument and evidence” (Gross, 2006, 
112). In each of these examples, Gross takes texts presumed to be 
“rational” and shows how “rhetorical ethos, pathos, and logos are 
naturally present in scientific texts,” thus proving that “science can 
constrain but hardly eliminate the full range of persuasive choices 
on the part of its participants” (Gross, 2006, 29). Human beings, 
that is to say, are not mechanical logical machines; they encounter 
the world as human beings with all their capacities, desires, 
limitations, and assumptions, and their language about the world is 
always weighted, strategic, and intentional. 
Consistent with the tenor of most contemporary history of 
science, Gross makes the important point that truths are not so 
much discovered as fought over, that the caretakers of knowledge in 
any age are bound up with structures of power and authority, and 
that the scientific community often accepts arguments in the short 
term (or even the long-term) for reasons other than pure 
rationality. To the extent that readers still might hold to the myth of 
the dispassionate, objective scientist who encounters “reality” 
empirically and then infers a rational “truth” based on that reality, 
all of these examples may come as a revelation. To them, Gross 
makes a further political point with respect to the authority often 
granted to science based on this myth. There is politics in the 
authority that Gross sees at work in “debates over fluoridation, the 
SST, and nuclear power” (Gross, 1996, 190). For him, it is 
important in these cases to “remind ourselves that the real issue is 
not the effect of particular initiatives; it is the arrogance of experts, 
their attempt to circumvent in their own interests the checks and 
balances of an open society” (Gross, 1996, 192). Thus, one of the 
important contributions of Gross’s work is simply to make science 
fallible, and to show that “the sciences create bodies of knowledge 
so persuasive as to seem unrhetorical—to seem, simply, the way the 
world is” (Gross, 1996, 207). That is why the last sentence of The 
Rhetoric of Science takes aim at realism, arguing that for 
rhetoricians, “Realism must remain an analytical target, a 
rhetorical construct like any other” (Gross, 1996, 207). From this 
perspective, the reason for Gross’s insistence on a “full” rhetoric of 
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science becomes clear: to leave any scientific “core” left behind is to 
leave in place the authority of expertise granted by realism that 
corrodes the public sphere and renders rhetoric a marginal art. 
Despite the consistent assault on the tenets of metaphysical 
realism, Gross nonetheless draws back from a Gorgias-style 
sophistical relativism that denies nature’s existence, knowability, 
and communicability. A rhetoric of science does not deny the 
validity of what we today consider “brute facts” such that “planes 
fly” or “men can’t have babies” (Gross, 2006, 42). As he explains, 
“No theory of physics can ignore flight; no theory of biology can 
turn its back on sex; no optics can dismiss refraction” (Gross, 2006, 
42). For instance, he acknowledges that observation sentences such 
as “‘On day y, planet x exhibits a retrograde motion of z degrees of 
arc’” were taken to be brute facts by the likes of Ptolemy, 
Copernicus, Kepler, and Newton because they were recurrent and 
reliable generalizations about specific appearances (Gross, 2006, 
43).  Far from denying the reality of things, he asserts that “what is 
stable in science is the much-denigrated world of appearances, 
embodied in observation sentences, the only world with which 
science must square itself” (Gross, 2006, 43). Here we have what 
sounds like a traditional assertion of logical empiricism: the view 
that language, while never being able to precisely “mirror” reality, 
nonetheless can reach reliable characterizations of reality based on 
repeated observations of particular phenomena captured in precise 
language. From this perspective, rhetoric would seem to be limited 
to its traditional concerned with how facts come to bear on issues of 
practical and ethical judgment rather than arguing about whether 
or not planet x exhibits retrograde motion of z degrees of arc. 
Still, Gross does not leave the sophistical spirit behind. It 
reappears again in the view that facts are by their nature linguistic 
and therefore are not essentially bound to this much-denigrated 
world of appearances. Although Gross asserts that the rhetoric of 
science cannot deny or be skeptical of much that we consider “brute 
fact,” he nonetheless asserts that “The claim of rhetorical analysis is 
that the phrase brute facts is an oxymoron” (Gross, 2006, 42-3). 
For the world of appearances does not carry meanings on its 
surface that are simply translated naturally into the language of the 
mind once they are experienced. As Gross makes clear, “facts are 
not in the world but in our heads; they are by nature linguistic—no 
language, no facts. By definition, a mind-independent reality has no 
semantic component. It can neither mean nor be incorporated 
directly into knowledge. Incorporation by reference is the only 
possibility” (Gross, 2006, 43). In short, “while our sentences about 
the world are caused by objects and events in the world, it is we and 
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not the world who attribute meaning to those objects and events” 
(Gross, 2006, 42). From Gross’s perspective, rhetoric leaves the law 
court and assembly and becomes part and parcel of every effort to 
make meaning of the world of experience.  
The problem is that when rhetoric becomes detached from its 
traditional habitation within moments of contingency, urgency, and 
judgment, it also loses its very character as rhetoric. In the case of 
Gross, this means that rhetoric ceases to be grounded in the 
perspective of Aristotle or the Sophists and instead is determined 
by the premises of analytic philosophy—in particular, the 
philosophy of Quine. Accordingly, in order to show just what kind 
of rhetoric Gross’s rhetoric of science is, I turn toward the work of 
Quine to explore the nature and consequences of his notions of 
under-determination, holism, and ontological relativity.  I suggest 
that Quine’s position leads to extremely fruitful insights concerning 
the “reality” of the objects of science and the central importance of 
language, experience, utterance, and behavior within any scientific 
inquiry, and that any rhetoric of science can take valuable lessons 
away from a study of the holistic tradition of analytic philosophy. 
However, I also argue that simply grafting a classical rhetorical 
vocabulary onto Quine’s philosophy leads to the “thin” style of 
analysis that Gross seeks to avoid and that a “full” rhetoric of 
science must ground itself in the rhetorical attitude embodied in 
the classical tradition and its concern for judgment, not simply 
about matters of consensual belief but about matters of action as 
well. 
Quine on the Pragmatics of Language 
To understand what Gross means by a “fully” rhetorical account of 
science, we must turn to the work of W.V.O. Quine. For although 
the original text of The Rhetoric of Science underwent considerable 
modification in its new form as Starring the Text, one thing has 
remained unchanged: its reliance on premises of analytical 
philosophy largely centered on the work of Quine. In the original 
text, Gross quotes a passage from Quine’s most famous essay, “Two 
Dogmas of Empiricism,” to “make a point that is central to a view of 
scientific truth compatible with rhetorical analysis” (Gross, 1996, 
202). The quoted passage runs as follows:  
Total science, mathematical and natural and human, 
is…underdetermined by experience. The edge of the 
system must be kept squared with experience; the rest, 
with all its elaborate myths or fictions, has as its 
objective the simplicity of laws (Quine, 1980, 45, quoted 
in Gross, 1996, 202).  
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Here we find expressed three of Quine’s most foundational 
principles, that of under-determination, holism, and ontological 
relativity. The first posits that no truth claim ever possesses 
sufficient empirical verification to render it impervious to 
argument; the second asserts that any truth claim only finds its 
meaning within a totality of the discourse that gives it its meaning; 
and the third argues that the meaning of any “object” encountered 
in sensory experience is only defined relative to a background 
language. Taken together, Gross asserts, these three principles 
carve an “intellectual space for the rhetoric of science” (202).  
The emphasis I am giving to Quine may seem disproportionate 
to his physical presence in Starring the Text, appearing as he does 
on only two pages. Yet these two pages summarize the view of both 
rhetoric and science that pervades the entire text. Whereas Quine 
only features prominently in The Rhetoric of Science in the closing 
pages of the epilogue, his work, moreover bolstered by quotes from 
Davidson, Putnam, and Goodman, form the basis of the third 
chapter in Starring the Text that articulates “the kind of rhetoric 
science is” (Gross, 2006, 32). As Gross puts it most succinctly: 
“From the point of view of rhetoric, the truths of science are not 
beyond argument; rather, they are the achievements of argument; 
science rests on facts and theories that have been argued into place” 
(Gross, 2006, 43). Importantly, this statement is not simply an 
assertion of relativism or skepticism. It is an assertion that grows 
out of the epistemological and ontological premises of Quine’s 
analytic philosophy, according to which sense experiences only 
acquire meaning by being embodied in observation sentences and 
incorporated within a logical system of naming and predication. In 
Gross’s view, “Scientific knowledge represents a consensus 
concerning the coherence and empirical adequacy of scientific 
utterances,” while rhetoric represents the practice of disrupting and 
reconstituting that consensus through argument (Gross, 2006, 43). 
Quine’s analytic philosophy thus provides a thick foundation on 
which the rhetoric of science can stand. Instead of being an 
afterthought, Quine forms the theoretical basis of the entire book. 
One likely reason Gross found Quine’s work particularly salient 
for rhetoric is the fact that it was popularized by Richard Rorty in 
his highly influential 1979 book, Philosophy and the Mirror of 
Nature, which used Quine’s brand of analytic philosophy (suitably 
adumbrated by Donald Davidson) to advance a neo-pragmatic 
understanding of language and truth that Rorty admits bumps up 
against rhetoric. Like Gross, Rorty finds in Quine’s holism a clear 
rejection the “quest for certainty” and the conception of knowledge 
“as accuracy of representation,” and a clear embrace of the 
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“commitment to the thesis that justification is not a matter of a 
special relation between ideas (or words) and objects, but of 
conversation, of social practice” (Rorty, 1979, 170). Rorty realizes, 
of course, that Quine, unlike himself, is no post-modernist, and that 
in blurring the “line between science and philosophy” Quine 
assumes that “he has thereby shown that science can replace 
philosophy” (Rorty, 1979, 171). However, Rorty, unlike Quine, sees 
no justification why science should be the choice over “the arts, or 
politics, or religion” (Rorty, 1979, 171). With certainty reduced to 
the pragmatic utility of background languages, Rorty sees the field 
now cleared for any humanistic endeavor, including rhetoric, to 
take up the mantle of knowledge and carry it forward. After all, for 
Rorty, to advocate holism is to advocate conversation, and “the 
ability to sustain a conversation, is to see human beings as 
generators of new descriptions rather than beings one hopes to be 
able to describe accurately” (Rorty, 1979, 378). Thus, Quine’s 
principles of holism and under determination free us from the 
chains of mind-as-mirror-of-nature realism that bind us and allows 
a flourishing of new, more humanistic, descriptions of ourselves 
and our world. This is Rorty in a nutshell. 
Quine’s apparent, but unacknowledged rhetorical sensibilities 
would naturally make him attractive to rhetorical scholars, 
particularly those within the rhetoric of science who wish to use his 
scientific ethos to build bridges across disciplines. In order to 
explore the possibilities and limits of adopting his perspective in 
rhetoric, I will focus primarily on exploring the significance of two 
of his most famous essays, “The Two Dogmas of Empiricism” and 
“Ontological Relativity.” These make the most provocative and 
rhetoric sounding claims. For within this framework, questions of 
ontology—that is, of “being”—are minimized, and questions of 
epistemology—that is, of “knowing”—are equated with questions of 
semantics. Science thus ceases to become the study of “reality” and 
the representation of that reality in a discourse of “truth.” Instead, 
science becomes a systematic incorporation of observation 
sentences within a complex logical system of fictions whose only 
goal is to square itself with the empirical edges of the system. Here, 
it seems, is a view of science that opens the possibility of what 
Gross refers to as alternately a “complete” and a “full” rhetorical 
description of science (Gross, 2006, 64). 
Quine’s most famous essay, “The Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” 
lays out his vision of holism that effective destroys empiricism’s two 
dogmas and puts in their place a coherence view of truth. The first 
dogma is a belief that one can make a cleavage between analytic 
and synthetic truths. Analytic truths refer to those truths that are 
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true only in reference to the semantic rules of a language or a logic 
(akin to symbolic systems such as mathematics). Synthetic truths 
refer to matters of fact, presumably empirical, that refer to actual 
existences (such as “there are brick houses on Elm Street”).  The 
second dogma is the belief in epistemic reductionism, or “the belief 
that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical 
construct upon terms which refer to immediate experience” (Quine, 
1980, 20). However, the belief in epistemic reductionism rests upon 
the belief that there exists analytic and synthetic truths, or the 
“feeling that the truth of a statement is somehow analyzable into a 
linguistic component and a factual component” (Quine, 1980, 41). 
Quine concludes that “the two dogmas are, indeed, at root 
identical” (Quine, 1980, 41). Reductionism defends the abstract-
sounding claims of science (i.e. “human beings have evolved 
through natural selection”) by asserting that these beliefs are 
grounded in verifiable empirical claims (i.e. “a fossilized skull with 
a human sized brain capacity was found in this rock formation”), 
which is simply another way of saying that analytic truths are built 
up from the bricks of synthetic truths.  
Because the dividing line between rhetoric and science is often 
drawn at the line between hard fact and mere opinion, it is easy to 
understand how Quine can be read as emancipating the rhetorical 
perspective when he proceeds to completely undermine these two 
dogmas of empiricism. In Quine’s view, the analytic/synthetic 
distinction on which reductionism has been based has “been the 
root of much nonsense” (Quine, 1980, 42). The strategy Quine 
employs to counter both dogmas is rather simple. It involves an 
extension of the continued trend to see meaning, definition, and 
reference in terms of more and more complex structures built from 
atomistic bits. Moving from the “impossible term-by-term 
empiricism of Locke and Hume,” we first recognized that “the 
statement, rather than the term” should be used as the “unit 
accountable to an empiricist critique” (Quine, 1980, 42). But Quine 
urges that “even in taking the statement as unit we have drawn our 
grid too finely” (Quine, 1980, 42). Indeed, from Quine’s 
perspective, “the unit of empirical significance is the whole of 
science” (Quine, 1980, 42). Science is not made up of “the 
statements of science taken one by one,” but of the entire system of 
interconnections taken as a whole (Quine, 1980, 42). In fact, our 
individual statements themselves acquire their meaning from the 
“total system,” much in the way we would think that the 
identification of an atom is meaningless without having accepted 
the total system of atomic theory (Quine, 1980, 44). In this way, 
Quine undermines a kind of naïve belief in induction, or the sense 
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in which simply accumulating simple perception somehow adds up 
to a general theory like building a brick wall out of bricks. In reality, 
the “bricks” that make up the facts of a scientific theory are defined 
only after accepting a certain theory of bricks that is tied up with a 
blueprint for building walls. 
Rhetorically, one natural consequence of accepting Quine’s 
holism is to undermine traditional realism, whether scientific or 
Platonic, which often was used to distinguish rhetoric from 
“reality.” This realism often takes the form of the correspondence 
theory of truth in which, in Gross’s words, “truth is the 
correspondence between the sentences we form and the states of 
affairs in the world” (Quine, 1980, 41). But in Quine, the 
eradication of the synthetic/analytic distinction also undermines 
the integrity and autonomy of the empirical facts that make the 
correspondence theory plausible. Since the parts take their value 
from the larger whole, “Any statement can be held true come what 
may, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the 
system” (Quine, 1980, 43). Science is no longer an accumulation of 
bricks (i.e., stable observational facts), but is “a man-made fabric 
which impinges on experience only along the edges” (Quine, 1980, 
42).   If this is the case, it is difficult to know where science ends 
and rhetoric begins—at least insofar as we understand the 
distinction between the two discourses to be distinguished by their 
ability to represent reality accurately without distortion, 
uncertainty, or ulterior motives, a criteria that goes back to Plato 
(or even before Plato to Parmenides). 
But this leveling of distinctions between genres of discourse is 
not restricted to rhetoric and science in Quine. His work levels the 
distinction between any and all discourses that purport to say 
anything about what exists, how it exists, or how we know it exists. 
For instance, Quine famously dissolves the ontological differences 
between the objects of religion and the objects of physical science. 
Because, for him, any isolated statement of fact is meaningless 
outside of a larger theory, “Physical objects and the gods differ only 
in degree and not in kind”; they are “conceptually imported into the 
situation as convenient intermediaries—not by definition in terms 
of experience, but simply as irreducible posits” (Quine, 1980, 44). 
The question is not whether gods or atoms are actually there; the 
question is how well we can integrate observation sentences about 
them into our larger vocabulary in a coherent manner. Quine 
believes in physical objects and not Homer’s gods, but he does so 
not because he can reach out and grasp their metaphysical being—
i.e., not because they are more “real”—but because “the myth of 
physical objects is epistemologically superior to most in that it has 
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proved more efficacious than other myths as a device for working a 
manageable structure into the flux of experience” (Quine, 1980, 
44). It is just here that Quine cops to American pragmatism. In 
other words, Quine measures the epistemological superiority of any 
theory by how many observation sentences about sense stimuli can 
be effectively integrated into a coherent network of utterances that 
we have warrant to believe to be “real.”  
Whatever vestiges of the correspondence theory of truth may 
have been left behind after the assault by “Two Dogmas” are finally 
stripped away in his essay “Ontological Relativity.” Here, Quine 
explicitly rejects the “copy theory” of language on which the 
correspondence theory of truth is based, a theory of language that 
holds to “the myth of a museum in which the exhibits are meanings 
and the words are labels” (Quine, 1969, 27). That is to say, if the 
“museum myth” was true, we could point to a thing and state its 
name and everyone would understand what we meant by that term. 
However, the “museum myth” is exactly that—a myth. Instead of 
having a one-to-one correspondence of language to object, we have 
the “inscrutability of reference,” or the situation where a single 
word can mean many things under many conditions, and just what 
exactly one is talking about is often unclear (Quine, 1969, 47). In 
short, we have a situation where “There is no fact of the matter” 
(Quine, 1969, 47). What there is is a flux of sensory experience that 
makes sense to us only through the invocation of what Quine calls a 
“background language” that provides the context for any utterance 
(Quine, 1969, 48). In other words, “It makes no sense to say what 
the objects of a theory are, beyond saying how to interpret or 
reinterpret that theory in another” (Quine, 1969, 50). Ontological 
relativity, in sum, is a doctrine that denies that the being of entities 
is somehow intrinsic to the entities themselves or the sensory 
experiences they produce, but is relative to a theoretical language in 
which those entities are interpreted and defined. 
Lastly, if Quine still seems to be speaking a language somewhat 
far from the sphere of rhetorical practice, he appears to correct it in 
his provocative espousal of what he calls a “thorough pragmatism” 
with respect to our understanding of the relationship between 
science, language, and sensory stimulation (Quine, 1980, 46). In his 
very spare form of pragmatism, “we recognize that there are no 
meanings, nor likeness, nor distinctions of meaning, beyond what 
are implicit in people’s dispositions to overt behavior” (Quine, 
1969, 29). Specifically, the behavior Quine is interested in is a type 
of utterance made in response to a particular sensory stimulation. 
That is why he defines an observation sentence (quoted by Gross, 
2006, 42) as an utterance “on which all speakers of the language 
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give the same verdict when given the same concurrent stimulation” 
(Quine, 1969, 86-7).  For instance, on perceiving something white, 
small, and furry with two long years, one might say “Lo! A Rabbit!” 
and receive assent from other speakers based on an implicit 
agreement on the validity of a background language concerning 
rabbits. Pragmatically, what matters is not the correspondence 
between our utterance and “reality” but whether our utterance 
expedites our dealings with sense experiences and can be ultimately 
validated by the behavior and utterances of those around us. It is in 
this latter respect that Quine translates questions of epistemology 
into questions of communication. Epistemology is less about what 
we know to exist and more about what we can effectively say what 
exists by gaining assent from others through our utterances. 
Understanding Quine’s perspective helps make sense of Gross’s 
contradictory-sounding statments that, on the one hand,  science is 
solely the product of argumentation while, on the other hand, it is 
not only rhetoric. Following Quine, science can in one way be said 
to be solely a product of argumentation in so far as any apparent 
“fact” is amenable to revision, incorporation, or rejection by making 
adjustments elsewhere in the discursive system.  As Quine writes, 
“Even a statement very close to the periphery can be held true in 
the face of recalcitrant experience by pleading hallucination or by 
amending certain statements of the kind called logical laws” 
(Quine, 1980, 43). Yet, as indicated by this passage, defending a 
statement in the face of recalcitrant experience (or attempting to 
refute the truth of the statement consistently verified by 
experience) requires a considerable amount of rhetorical labor. For 
the most part, Quine suggests that usually it is pragmatically useful 
simply to accept the habitual utterances of one’s peers as valid if 
one wishes to get along in the world. To put it in rhetorical terms, 
while it is always theoretically possible to make the weaker 
argument the stronger, pragmatically it is not always the most 
prudent option. 
Finding Rhetoric in the Rhetoric of Science 
If Quine make sense of the apparent paradox of Gross’s 
acknowledging and denying the existence of brute facts, he does 
little to clarify what the meaning of the modifier “rhetorical” might 
mean in his system. It is true that Quine eradicates the 
correspondence theory of truth and acknowledges the importance 
of background languages, utterances, and argumentation in 
scientific inquiry. But never does he refer to any of this as 
particularly rhetorical. Instead, he privileges philosophy—or rather 
the philosophy of logic—the dominant art insofar as logic is 
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concerned with the cognitive and semantic relationship between 
words and objects. Of course, like Rorty, Gross argues that Quine’s 
personal desire for science and logic to be the master disciplines 
can easily be overridden. His annihilation of the correspondence 
theory of truth opens the field for rhetoric as much as it does for 
science, art, religion, and culture. But as this essay will show, 
constructing a vision of the rhetoric of science based on Quine’s 
premises alone comes with a significant price, which is the 
abandonment of the traditional orientation of rhetoric toward 
practical judgment within kairotic moments that arise in the 
contexts of political action and meaning.  
The problem with Gross’s use of Quine to assault the citadel of 
realism is not in its emancipatory aim. That is a well-aimed project. 
The problem is that the effort to reinterpret all of science as rhetoric 
comes with a price of stripping rhetoric of its character as a situated 
art. The irony of Gross’s use of logicians like Quine to provide a 
foundation for the rhetorical analysis of science is that it presumes 
a definition of rhetoric drawn almost exclusively from the 
philosophy of science. What Gross actually does is less to redescribe 
science rhetorically than to redescribe rhetoric epistemologically. 
He sees a “full” rhetoric of science as going beyond its traditional 
interest in the popularization of science, science education, or the 
intersection of science with public policy and embracing the idea 
that “knowledge is rhetorical” (Gross, 2006, 7). But this is a way of 
saying that the task of rhetoric is not to advocate for a particular 
action within a context of judgment but to articulate and advance 
knowledge claims whose primary end is the creation of warranted 
beliefs about objects, laws, and processes. Yet since this is precisely 
what Quine sees as the goal of logic, then logic and rhetoric become 
effectively interchangeable arts. For Gross to use Quine to argue for 
a rhetorical analysis of science is to suggest replacing the word 
“logic” with the word “rhetoric” in his philosophy while leaving the 
rest of  it effectively unchanged. 
This colonization of rhetoric by logic in Gross is easy to miss, 
however, especially in The Rhetoric of Science, because it is masked 
by his surface use of classical rhetorical terminology and his 
insistence that Aristotle’s Rhetoric is his “master guide” (Gross, 
1996, 18). It soon becomes clear, however, that the Rhetoric is not, 
in fact, his master text, for no sooner is Aristotle introduced than 
Gross insists that “the Rhetoric must be updated,” meaning in effect 
that rhetoric and science must be seen as differences of degree and 
not kind (Gross, 1996, 18). The first update we have already 
explored —the explicit incorporation of “relevant modern thinkers” 
such as Quine (Gross, 1996, 19). But two more changes stand out. 
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First, Gross erases the distinction between syllogistic and 
enthymematic reasoning, which for Aristotle meant the difference 
between a complete and self-contained logical argument and an 
incomplete argument that began with uncertain premises and 
relied on audience participation for its completion. Gross insists 
that the differences are “not in kind but only in degree” (Gross, 
1996, 12). Following Quine, Gross argues that “no deductive logic is 
a closed system, all of whose premises can be stipulated; every 
deductive chain consists of a finite number of steps between each of 
which an infinite number may be intercalated” (Gross, 1996, 12). 
Consequently, the protest that rhetoric has no business in science 
because scientific argument does not employ enthymemes is swept 
away. For Gross, all arguments are enthymematic because all 
arguments are underdetermined and therefore are capable of 
rhetorical analysis. And it is important for Gross to have realized 
the implications of this revised logic for our understanding of 
scientific argumentation. 
But an enthymeme is defined by more than simply is relative 
probabilities as opposed to its certainty. In fact, Aristotle places 
greater emphasis on the fact that enthymemes, as opposed to 
syllogism, are persuasive precisely because they invite audience 
participation (Garver, 1994). And it is this characteristic, and not 
the certainty of the premises, which has long been the identifying 
quality of the enthymeme. Lloyd Bitzer, for instance, argues 
extensively against the position that the relative completeness of an 
argument is what distinguishes an enthymeme from a syllogism. 
Instead, he argues that the defining quality of an enthymeme is the 
fact that it involves the “joint efforts of speaker and audience” 
which “intimately unite speaker and audience and provide the 
strongest possible proofs” (Bitzer, 1991, 408). Thomas Conley, 
meanwhile, defines an enthymeme as an argument whose success 
“is dependent on the ability of speakers and audiences to 
apprehend and interpret connections and differences” (Conley, 
1984, 182). Consequently, even enthymemes that have certain 
premises remain enthymemes insofar as they bind speaker and 
audience together in an act of co-creation within a specific moment. 
So it is really Gross’s third update of Aristotle that is far more 
provocative and controversial with respect to our understanding of 
the place of rhetoric in the rhetoric of science. This update 
encourages rhetoricians to expand the notion of audience beyond 
its situated character, relying instead on the pragmatic fiction of 
what Chaim Perelman and L. Oblbreachts-Tyteca called the 
“universal audience,” or what Gross calls that “ideal aggregate that 
can refuse a rhetor’s conclusions on the pain of irrationality” 
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(Gross, 1996, 18). Scientists, he explains, usually do not write to 
specific individuals but to an abstract audience whose standards of 
argumentation they have internalized and that they take to exist not 
in a specific place and time but in all places and at all times. Of 
course, Gross realizes (just as all scientists realize) that such an 
ideal audience does not exist empirically. But he nonetheless claims 
with considerable warrant that “all scientists attribute to imagined 
colleagues standards of judgment presumed to be universal: not in 
the sense that everyone judges by means of them, but in the sense 
that anyone, having undergone scientific training, must presuppose 
them as a matter of course” (Gross, 1996,  19). The replacement of a 
real audience with a normative “universal audience” therefore 
allows rhetoricians to interpret scientific texts from the same 
universal standpoint without having to consider the specific 
contributions that a situated audience makes in order to render 
judgment on a particular state of affairs. 
The use to which the universal audience can be put within the 
rhetoric of science is made more explicit in Starring the Text. 
There, Gross outlines a method of rhetorical criticism that allows 
for the interpretation of texts from the imagined perspective of the 
universal audience rather than any specific empirical one. Indeed, 
“It is by means of this universal audience that the natural sciences 
come within the sphere rhetoric” (Gross, 2006, 56). The universal 
audience, Gross writes, “is simply one that must be presupposed; it 
is the audience that scientists must see themselves as addressing 
when they write or speak” (Gross, 2006, 56). In the case of 
evolutionary taxonomy, for instance, the universal audience is the 
one that the scientist holds in his or her mind when trying to win 
them over. A rhetorical analysis would thus “show how scientists 
create a world that persuades their fellows, a world in which plants 
and animals have been brought to life, raise to membership in a 
taxonomical group, and made to illustrate and generate 
evolutionary theory” (Gross, 2006, 56-7). But by “fellows,” Gross 
clearly means to refer to all possible scientists who study 
evolutionary taxonomy, both in the present and in the future—and 
for good reason. What persuades a certain group of scientists at a 
certain time may not persuade a different group at a later time, and 
vice versa. Since the text can endure through time in a way that an 
arguer cannot, positing a universal audience allows rhetoricians to 
concentrate on the text itself rather than restricting interpretation 
to a specific audience in history.  
As reasonable as this method of updating Aristotle appears, it 
immediately comes in tension with the situated character of 
rhetoric when Gross proposes stasis theory as a method of 
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rhetorical criticism of science. Stasis theory, of course, represented 
a way of determining what is at stake in a forensic courtroom, 
asking questions of fact, definition, quality, and jurisdiction in 
order to determine what would be the best defense for a client. By 
shedding the criteria of certainty of premises and participation of a 
situated audience, Gross is able to draw a parallel between the 
method by which we consider whether treason occurred and asking, 
in science, “What entities really exist? Does phlogiston? Do 
quarks?” (Gross, 2006, 22). Just as the jury of Greek heroes decides 
on the guilt of Palamedes after his trial, so too with Einstein and 
atoms: “Before Albert Einstein’s papers on Brownian movement, 
the existence of atoms was in question; after, their existence was 
regarded as confirmed” (Gross, 2006, 22). The fact that the trial of 
Palamedes ended in a specific judgment by a particular audience on 
a specific occasion (his guilt and execution) whereas the “trial” of 
atoms is an ongoing affair before a universal audience is not a 
factor in Gross’s account. In the updated Aristotle, it is not 
particular judgments by situated audiences that matter but 
provisional consensus about knowledge claims arrived at in the 
ongoing deliberations of a particular epistemic community.  
This is why in the updated Aristotle, it is actually Quine, not 
Aristotle, who becomes the master guide of rhetorical analysis of 
science. The reason is that Quine is also unconcerned with matters 
of particular judgment that call audiences to action. The only 
“action” Quine is interested in is the act of consensual utterance, of 
saying “yay” or “nay” to statements like “Lo! A rabbit!” He is not 
interested in prosecuting the rabbit, hunting the rabbit, killing the 
rabbit, experimenting with the rabbit, genetically modifying the 
rabbit, or buying the rabbit as a pet for his kids. For in each of these 
situations, one must make a practical judgment about the rabbit in 
relationship to the desires of an audience and the constraints of an 
immediate situation. Once the demand for praxis becomes 
paramount, all manner of motivations, like anxiety, credibility, 
love, hate, passion, trust, and urgency, suddenly become highly 
influential—as Aristotle recognized by making ethos and pathos 
constitutive modifiers of logos in rhetorical argumentation. For 
Quine, all of these motivations, while obviously important in the 
moment, are ephemeral and distracting from the purely 
epistemological question of whether or not we have sufficient 
warrant to categorize a certain nexus of sensory stimuli as a 
“rabbit” or some other object. Thus, as David Depew has observed, 
in contradistinction to pragmatists like John Dewey, who “tried to 
naturalize the intention-laden and meaning-full world that humans 
share in their daily life…Quine’s naturalism extended no further 
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than ‘extensionalist’ ontologies that allow the inferential apparatus 
of propositional logic to map onto the physical world that impinges 
on agents in such a way that bits of behavior are elicited and shaped 
in response to it” (Depew, 1995, 115). In other words, Quine was 
largely uninterested in the mundane world of practice that so 
infatuated the earlier pragmatists. For Quine, it was obvious that 
this or that person may refer to this or that nexus of sensory stimuli 
in all manner of ways, sometimes for strategic purposes, sometimes 
for humor, and sometimes because they are operating under 
hallucination. But none of this matters for logic. What matters is 
the clarity and long-term reliability of a denotative designation 
across multiple circumstances and communities. But that is 
something other than the art that we tend to associate with 
rhetoric. 
The Kairos of Classical Rhetoric 
If there is anything distinctive about the classical rhetorical 
tradition, it is its attention to the power of the persuasive word 
when spoken in a timely moment of choice. It is this difference in 
the context of the speech act, and not the difference between the 
“truth” of what he said, that distinguishes rhetoric from logic. One 
sees the difference between the two arts in Gorgias’s Defense of 
Palamedes. Palamedes defends himself against charges of treason 
and appeals to his audience of Greek heroes by appealing to their 
fear of making the wrong decision. He says: “If it were possible to 
make the truth of actions clear and evident to listeners through 
words, a decision based on what has been said would now be easy. 
But since this is not so, safeguard my body, wait for a while longer, 
and make your decision with truth” (Gorgias, DK11, trans. Gagarin 
and Woodruff, 1995). Here is the difference between the two arts. 
Logic, unconstrained by situated demands of judgment, 
hypothetically has the luxury of waiting not only longer but forever. 
The day of judgment never comes with logic, only the day of 
revision and reconsideration. But rhetoric must throw its full force 
behind a judgment in the moment, rallying whatever resources it 
can to advocate for a choice here and now. The stakes are high in 
rhetoric, as Palamedes warns his audience: “If you kill me unjustly, 
it will be evident to many; for I am not unknown, and your 
wickedness will be known and evident to all Greeks. For this 
injustice you, not the accuser, will be blamed in everyone’s eyes, 
since the outcome of the trial is in your hands” (Gorgias, DK11, 
trans. Gagarin and Woodruff, 1995). Palamedes can make this 
argument because a sentence of guilt made in his trial is 
irreversible. Later logical analysis of evidence may find him 
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innocent, but it cannot bring back his life. That is something that 
must be defended with rhetoric and with all resources he can 
muster. 
From the classical perspective, rhetoric arises whenever we feel 
the pressure to make a choice under constraints and uncertainty. In 
those situations, all realists, materialists, idealists, and relativists 
embrace rhetoric not because they want to but because they must. 
Thomas Farrell, channeling the non-updated spirit of Aristotle, 
aptly describes the context under which rhetoric arises: 
When we have some stake, or interest, in the array of 
things around us, for instance, we are not likely to be 
concerned with an underlying cause or a larger, more 
inclusive general opinion. For the particularity of things 
has become a provocation. We cannot leave well enough 
alone. We also disagree about things. We may try to 
ignore them. We may take issue as regards what they 
mean. Eventually—perhaps sooner than we wish—we 
may have to own up to them, make judgments about 
them, and act on them. This is the tension that Aristotle 
captures with his rhetorical mood of contingency. Here 
we suddenly have the unsettledness of appearances, 
wherein differences are crystallized in opposed 
directions which may be resolved one way or the other 
(Farrell, 1993, 27). 
For Aristotle, then, it is the mood of contingency that calls forth 
rhetoric as a productive art, just as it is the identification of texts 
that move people to action within contingent situations that calls 
forth rhetoric as a suitable mode of criticism. According to him, the 
subjects of rhetorical deliberation “are such as seem to present us 
with alternative possibilities” (Aristotle, Rhetoric 1357a5, trans. 
Roberts, in Aristotle 1984). Aristotle treated rhetoric as an art of 
putting people in a frame of mind that make certain possibilities 
more attractive than others in moments of choice, thereby making 
any rhetorical criticism grounded in Aristotle an art of 
retrospectively determining why specific texts had the power to 
move real audiences in particular ways within in those moments.  
Aristotle, in short, makes the art of rhetoric an explicitly 
situated art. Rhetoric for him is inextricably bound to the 
contingency of the moment, the motivations of an audience, and 
the imperatives of judgment. It is only within these situated 
moments that the full power of such rhetorical proofs as ethos, 
pathos, enthymeme, and style become instruments for achieving a 
practical and political aim. That such proofs inevitably find their 
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way into even the most technical exposition is beyond a doubt, as 
Gross aptly demonstrates. Language being a human art, it will 
always convey some aspect of our humanity, including our biases, 
our desires, and our fears, and so even the most “dispassionate” 
scientist is not immune to its appeals. What makes scientific 
discourse different from rhetoric has little to do with the degree of 
“persuasiveness” of any text looked at only as a text. The difference 
is found in the contexts in which those texts operate. Most scientific 
texts operate in contexts in which no practical judgment is called 
for beyond a consideration of new truth claims and a 
reconsideration of old ones within the pages of academic journals. 
Rhetoric, by contrast, operates in context in which our choices 
make differences that cannot be so easily undone and that directly 
bear on matters of practice. Scientific argument thus becomes 
rhetorical when those judgments about “truth” intersect the realm 
of prudential judgment. It is at this point that scientists, often 
involuntarily, find themselves thrust into a public scientific 
controversy that makes hitherto obscure technical debates matters 
of rhetorical deliberation (Crick and Gabriel, 2010). It is thus the 
context in which scientific arguments are deployed, and not the 
specific content or epistemological validity of those arguments, that 
makes them rhetorical and thereby amenable to rhetorical analysis. 
Yet the majority of case studies Gross investigates tend to 
downplay if not overlook entirely the situatedness of any discourse. 
Instead, they focus on showing how “rhetoric” (understood as any 
effort at constructing a persuasive argument) is somehow present 
in situations that we would not otherwise think of as a rhetorical—
i.e., situations in which there is no clear judgment to be made. But 
little of this analysis, it turns out, requires any knowledge of 
rhetoric. The analysis of both Descartes and Newton is actually a 
philosophical critique of their metaphysics and methods. The 
reading of Darwin’s notebooks indicates the importance of making 
diagrams in the generation of tentative theories. The complex 
political climate in which Copernicus published his theories is 
reduced to a single non-rhetorical problem: “to make coherent 
physical sense of the apparent behavior of celestial objects” (Gross, 
2006, 112). The existence of peer review proves quite emphatically 
the lack of situatedness in science insofar as any claim “is neither 
scientific nor knowledge until it is the conviction, not merely of the 
individual or even a small group of like-minded adherence but of a 
broad consensus of practitioners” (Gross, 2006, 98). The debate 
over cold fusion hammers home that point that even the strong 
emotions tied up with intellectual rivalries between disciplinary 
communities can be overriden by “means of experimental 
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disconfirmation” pursued rigorously and methodically by those 
communities (Gross, 2006, 133). In none of these cases does the 
incorporation of the rhetorical tradition add anything substantial to 
the analysis, a claim verified by the fact that beyond the use of the 
word “rhetorical,” Gross incorporates none of the tradition to 
illuminate any aspect of these artifacts or situations. If anything, it 
demonstrates Quine’s point that logic, at least once suitably 
relativized, is sufficient to understand the scientific process without 
any need for its rhetorical counterpart.  
From a classical standpoint, however, if there is no judgment to 
be made and no action to be done, then all the strategies of rhetoric 
are so much wasted breath. For instance, what use is it to deliver an 
impassioned defense of one’s innocence at a pre-hearing in which 
the only concern is for the admissibility of facts in a court trial? 
Even if an audience was persuaded by one’s innocence, that is not 
the task at hand. But for a universal audience tasked with 
determining the epistemological validity of a scientific claim across 
time, the actual trial never comes. One simply has a never ending 
series of pre-hearings concerning the admissibility of facts and their 
relevance to theoretical assertions. In contradistinction, what 
makes the cases of historical figures like Darwin or Copernicus so 
fascinating for rhetoric was how their work had to overcome 
significant institutional, political, and religious resistance to even 
have their truth claims given a hearing. To the extent that their 
works overcame that resistance and influence the action of specific 
individuals, they are rhetorical. But insofar as their works 
contributed to the long-term development of established scientific 
theory based on a sustained investigation by a community of 
inquirers into validity of their truth claims with respect to 
accumulated empirical evidence, they are works of logic. This 
distinction has nothing to do with which discipline is more “true 
seeking” than the other or which text more “persuasive.” It has 
everything to do with whether or not we are more interested in the 
relationship between words, objects, and meanings than we are in 
the relationship between speech, action, and power. 
A Classical Rhetoric of Science 
The irony of trying to “find” rhetoric in science is that rhetoric 
rarely needs to be found. Its very nature as persuasive art is to 
always be out front and to be experienced as a challenge, not just to 
a community of minds, but to an audience of actors. And it is 
important to emphasize that Gross, too, celebrates this 
characteristic of rhetoric as a situated, quasi-political drama. In the 
chapter on “Science and Society,” Gross turns to the action by West 
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Virginia miners who fought to have black lung disease redefined in 
their interests in order to change both their working conditions and 
their ability to acquire compensation in the event of acquiring the 
disease. The problem they confronted was that black lung had been 
defined in such a way that it was difficult for miners to prove the 
causation that would lead to compensation. As Gross writes, “Until 
phosphorus necrosis, asbestosis, or byssinosis is defined by a 
medical science driven by the cognitive technical interest, neither 
match workers, tile workers, nor cotton workers can sicken and die 
of it; therefore their complaints are without an object” (Gross, 
2006, 155). Here is a case in which the conclusions of science are 
perceived to influence the lives of individuals, directly or indirectly, 
and thereby become relevant to ethical and political judgment. 
Notably, Gross identifies the specific point—a “breach”—at 
which what had been largely a question of logic and epistemology 
suddenly erupted into a public scientific controversy that involve 
multiple rhetorical actors. This event was a mine explosion in 1968 
which led to a “breach in the existing moral order—public anger 
among the miners followed by political action” (Gross, 2006, 153). 
Specifically, the miners unleashed a “fiery rhetoric aimed at the 
reform of the existing moral order,” and through such “histrionics” 
as mock funerals in the displays of diseased lungs to the press and 
legislators, the miners “initiated an insurgency that eventually 
provided more liberal compensation for Black Lung” (Gross, 2006, 
154). Notable about Gross’s analysis, too, is the attention he gives to 
specific (i.e., non-universal) audiences who were mobilized to act in 
response to particular rhetorical appeals made in the heat of the 
moment: 
From their early insurgency in the cold fields of West 
Virginia to their successful fight in Washington, the 
miners would have achieved little were it not for outside 
funding and the help of sympathetic legislators, 
physicians, and news media, competent attorneys 
working for a pittance, VISTA volunteers, and 
community organizers. It is these professionals who gave 
the miner’s organization its leadership and its focus. 
Without the deep-seated and general discontent of the 
miners, it is true, these outsiders would have achieved 
nothing, but there is no denying either that the power of 
the workers was mediated at each step by those willing 
to defy the interests of the class from which they came 
(Gross, 2006, 157). 
How different from the context in which Gross analyzes the work of 
Copernicus, Darwin, or Descartes! Here is a drama of multiple 
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actors interacting within a moment of particular judgment in which 
science comes to bear as a warrant for decision-making. Only in 
this case, the scientific consensus was challenged by a rhetoric of 
social action by ordinary citizens faced with urgent problems, a 
rhetoric that made legislators, business leaders, and scientists make 
specific choices that determined both the course of future research 
and the policies that are out of those research agendas. 
What Gross makes vividly clear in this case study is the fact that 
most rhetorical actors do not need to go through a long detour 
through analytic philosophy to call into question the realist doctrine 
of “brute facts.” In a rhetorical situation, all audiences take as 
“brute facts” those appearances that help their cause, just as all 
audiences take as “fictions” those accounts that are used to override 
their interests and refute their positions. The history of the word 
“fact” is, in fact, bound up with such selections (Poovey, 1998). The 
miners certainly would have little patience for Quine’s effort to 
problematize their utterance “Lo! Black Lung disease!” by showing 
how it was underdetermined by experience and relative to some 
background language. What they wanted was safer working 
conditions and compensation for what they believed to be a disease 
caused by excessive inhalation of coal dust. Similarly, an industry 
funded scientist might actually fully acknowledge that science is a 
man-made fabric that impinges reality only along the edges, but 
once thrown into the context of political deliberation, would speak 
the language of “brute facts” simply because her conclusions were 
being challenged by a motley crew of miners, attorneys, and 
activists. For what matters in rhetorical action is not some abstract 
belief about the existence of objects. What matters is how any belief 
can be used to leverage judgment in a particular case.  
Gross argues in the closing pages of Starring the Text that 
rhetoric is not simply after the advancement of knowledge claims 
within some ongoing ideal speech situation; it deals with “symbolic 
interaction in the sphere of social action” (Gross, 2006, 179). To 
find a place for rhetoric in science studies is therefore to find those 
places in which science intersects with the sphere of social action. 
This does not mean simply restricting rhetorical studies of science 
to science policy, however. It occurs at any point within scientific 
inquiry—even the most theoretical—in which specific audiences are 
tasked with making judgments and performed actions that turn a 
situation this way rather than that way, and when those judgments 
are influenced by a whole range of rhetorical appeals that are 
brought to bear on a moment of choice. For as Aristotle wrote, “The 
duty of rhetoric is to deal with such matters as we deliberate upon 
without arts or systems to guide us,” and “the subjects of our 
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deliberation are such as seem to present us with alternative 
possibilities” (Aristotle, Rhetoric 1357a1-5, trans. Roberts, in 
Aristotle 1984). These deliberations happen at all levels of human 
practice, for social action does not mean non-scientific action. It 
simply means action performed alongside interested others for the 
pursuit of aims, interests, and resources that are more than simply 
epistemological. And that we feel warranted to pursue this type of 
inquiry today without apology is in large part due to the work of 
Alan Gross, who accomplished that most difficult and laudable of 
intellectual goals that Aristotle also attributed to the Sophists—the 
beginning of something new.  
To pursue the rhetoric of science is to find those moments 
within a process of inquiry in which actors are presented with 
alternative possibilities and must make practical judgments without 
other arts or systems to guide them. These are moments when an 
individual scientist must decide to pursue one or another course of 
inquiry,  when institutions must open or close their doors to 
particular ideas that have an impact on the world of practice, when 
citizens must mobilize to make their voice heard against a 
institutional forms of power that use knowledge as a weapon, when 
public intellectuals are called upon to take their scientific ideas to a 
recalcitrant public uninterested in challenging long-held beliefs, 
when scientists appeal to their peers within crisis moments of their 
discipline, when scientific claims become warrants for practice, and 
when political practice threatens to overturn the assertions of 
science. These are moments of drama, of conflict, of heroism, of 
tragedy, of battle, of victory, of invention, of uncertainty, of 
possibility, and of beauty. The duty of rhetoric is to illuminate these 
moments in the practice of science in order to show that the 
achievement of knowledge is always a struggle and that rhetoric 
appears at those moments in which a battle must be won so that 
truth (at least as we conceive it) can have a chance to prevail in a 
world in which we live, move, and have our being. 
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